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A consensus has emerged that the remarkable behavior of IT
prices provides the key to the surge in US economic growth after
1995. The relentless decline in the prices of information technology
equipment and software has steadily enhanced the role of IT invest-
ment. Productivity growth in IT-producing industries has risen in
importance and a productivity revival is underway in the rest of
the economy.
The surge of IT investment in the United States after 1995 has
counterparts in all other industrialized countries. It is essential to
use comparable data and methodology in order to provide rigorous
international comparisons. A crucial role is played by measure-
ments of IT prices. The US national accounts have incorporated
measures of IT prices that hold performance constant since 1985.
Schreyer (2000) has extended these measures to other industrial-
ized countries by constructing «internationally harmonized prices».
The acceleration in the IT price decline in 1995 triggered a burst
of IT investment in all of the G7 nations — Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the UK, as well as the US. These countries also
experienced a rise in productivity growth in the IT-producing
industries. However, differences in the relative importance of these
industries have generated wide disparities in the impact of IT on
economic growth. The role of the IT-producing industries is great-
est in the US, which leads the G7 in output per capita. [JEL
Codes: C82, D24, E23].
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In this paper I present international comparisons of econom-
ic growth among the G7 nations — Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US. These comparisons focus on the
impact of investment in information technology (IT) equipment
and software over the period 1980-2001. In 1998 the G7 nations
accounted for nearly sixty percent of world output
1 and a much
larger proportion of world investment in IT. Economic growth in
the G7 has experienced a strong revival since 1995, driven by a
powerful surge in IT investment. 
The resurgence of economic growth in the United States dur-
ing the 1990’s and the crucial role of IT investment has been thor-
oughly documented and widely discussed.
2 Similar trends in the
other G7 economies have been more difficult to detect, partly be-
cause of discrepancies among official price indexes for IT equip-
ment and software identified by Andrew Wyckoff (1995).
3 Paul
Schreyer (2000) has constructed «internationally harmonized» IT
prices that eliminate many of these discrepancies.
4
Using internationally harmonized prices for France, Germany,
Italy, and the UK, I have analyzed the role of investment and pro-
ductivity as sources of growth in the G7 countries over the period
1980-2001. I have subdivided the period in 1989 and 1995 in order
to focus on the most recent experience. I have decomposed growth
of output for each country between growth of input and product-
ivity. Finally, I have allocated the growth of input between invest-
ments in tangible assets, especially information technology and
software, and human capital.
Growth in IT capital input per capita jumped to double-digit
levels in the G7 nations after 1995. This can be traced to acceler-
ation in the rate of decline of IT prices, analyzed in my Presi-
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1 See MADDISON A. (2001) for 1998 data for world GDP and the GDP of each
of the G7 countries. 
2 See JORGENSON D.W - STIROH K. (2000) and OLINER S. - SICHEL D. (2000).
3 See WYCKOFF A. (1995) 
4 See SCHREYER P.  (2000). COLECCHIA A. - SCHREYER P. (2002) have employed
these internationally harmonized prices in measuring the impact of IT invest-
ment. dential Address to the American Economic Association.
5 The
powerful surge in investment was most pronounced in Canada,
but capital input growth in Japan, the US, and the UK was only
slightly lower. France, Germany, and Italy also experienced double-
digit growth, but lagged considerably behind the leaders. 
During the 1980’s productivity played a minor role as a source
of growth for the G7 countries except Japan, where productivity
accounted for thirty percent of economic growth. Productivity
accounted for only fifteen percent of growth in the US, thirteen
percent in France and the UK, and twelve percent in Germany;
only two percent of growth in Canada was due to productivity,
while the decline of productivity retarded growth by fourteen
percent in Italy. Between 1989 and 1995 productivity growth
declined further in the G7 nations, except for Italy and Germany.
Productivity declined for France and the UK but remained posi-
tive for the US, Canada, and Japan. 
Productivity growth revived in all the G7 countries after 1995,
again with the exception of Germany and Italy. The resurgence
was most dramatic in Canada, the UK, and France, partly offset-
ting years of dismal productivity growth. Japan exhibited the high-
est growth in output per capita among the G7 nations from 1980
to 1995. Japan’s level of output per capita rose from the lowest in
the G7 to the middle of the group in 2001. Although this advance
owed more to input per capita than productivity, Japan’s product-
ivity growth far outstripped the other members of the G7. None-
theless, Japan’s productivity remained the lowest among the G7
nations.
The US led the G7 in output per capita for the period 1989-
2001. Canada’s edge in output per capita in 1980 had disappeared
by 1989. The US led the G7 countries in input per capita during
1980-2001, but US productivity languished below the levels of Can-
ada, France, and Italy. 
In Section 2 I outline the methodology for this study, based
on my Presidential Address. I have revised and updated the US
data presented there through 2001. Comparable data on investment
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5 See JORGENSON D.W. (2001). in information technology have been constructed for Canada by
Statistics Canada.
6 Data on IT for France, Germany, Italy, and the
UK have been developed for the European Commission by Bart
van Ark et Al. (2002).
7 Finally, data for Japan have been assembled
by myself and Kazuyuki Motohashi for the Research Institute on
Economy, Trade, and Industry.
8 I have linked these data by means
of the OECD’s purchasing power parities for 1999.
9
In Section 3 I consider the impact of IT investment and the
relative importance of investment and productivity in accounting
for economic growth among the G7 nations. Investments in human
capital and tangible assets, especially IT equipment and software,
account for the overwhelming proportion of growth. Differences in
the composition of capital and labor inputs are essential for
identifying persistent international differences in output and
accounting for the impact of IT investment. 
In Section 4 I consider alternative approaches to internation-
al comparisons. The great revival of interest in economic growth
among economists dates from Maddison’s (1982) updating and ex-
tension of Simon Kuznets’ (1971) long-term estimates of the
growth of national product and population for fourteen indus-
trialized countries, including the G7 nations. Maddison (1982,
1991) added Austria and Finland to Kuznets’ list and presented
growth rates covering periods beginning as early as 1820 and ex-
tending through 1989. 
Maddison (1987), (1991) also generated growth accounts for
major industrialized countries, but did not make level compar-
isons like those presented in Section 2 below. As a consequence,
productivity differences were omitted from the canonical formu-
lation of «growth regressions» by William Baumol (1986). This
proved to be a fatal flaw in Baumol’s regression model, remedied
by Nazrul Islam’s (1995) panel data model. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
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6 See BALDWIN J. - HARCHAOUI T.  (2002).
7 See VAN ARK B. - MELKA J. - MULDER N. - TIMMER M. - YPMA G. (2002).
8 See JORGENSON D.W - MOTOHASHI K. (2005).
9 See OECD (2002). Current data on purchasing power parities are available
from the OECD website: http://www.sourceoecd.org.2. - Investment and Productivity
My papers with Laurits Christensen and Dianne Cummings
(1980), (1981) developed growth accounts for the United States
and its major trading partners — Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for 1947-
1973. We employed GNP as a measure of output and incorporat-
ed constant quality indices of capital and labor input for each
country. Our 1981 paper compared levels of output, inputs, and
productivity for all nine nations.
I have updated the estimates for the G7 — Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States
— through 1995 in earlier work. The updated estimates are
presented in my papers with Chrys Dougherty (1996), (1997) and
Eric Yip (2000). We have shown that productivity accounted for
only eleven percent of economic growth in Canada and the United
States over the period 1960-1995.
My paper with Yip (2000) attributed forty-seven percent of
Japanese economic growth during the period 1960-1995 to prod-
uctivity growth. The proportion attributable to productivity ap-
proximated forty percent of growth for the four European coun-
tries — France (0.38), Germany (0.42), Italy (0.43), and the United
Kingdom (0.36). Input growth predominated over productivity
growth for all the G7 nations.
I have now incorporated new data on investment in informa-
tion technology equipment and software for the G7. I have also em-
ployed internationally harmonized prices like those constructed by
Schreyer (2000). As a consequence, I have been able to separate the
contribution of capital input to economic growth into IT and Non-
IT components. While IT investment follows similar patterns in all
the G7 nations, Non-IT investment varies considerably and helps
to explain important differences in growth rates among the G7.
2.1 Comparisons of Output, Input, and Productivity
My first objective is to extend my estimates for the G7 nations
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Following the methodology of my Presidential Address, I have
chosen GDP as a measure of output. I have included imputations
for the services of consumers’ durables as well as land, buildings,
and equipment owned by nonprofit institutions. I have also distin-
guished between investments in information technology equipment
and software and investments in other forms of tangible assets.
A constant quality index of capital input is based on weights
that reflect differences in capital consumption, tax treatment, and
the rate of decline of asset prices. I have derived estimates of cap-
ital input and property income from national accounting data.
Similarly, a constant quality index of labor input is based on weights
by age, sex, educational attainment, and employment status. I have
constructed estimates of hours worked and labor compensation
from labor force surveys for each country. 
In Table 1 I present output per capita for the G7 nations from
1980 to 2001, taking the US as 100.0 in 2000. Output and popu-
lation are given separately in Tables 2 and 3. I use 1999 purchasing
power parities from the OECD to convert output from domestic
prices for each country into US dollars. The US maintained its
lead among the G7 countries in output per capita after 1989. Cana-
da led the US in 1980, but fell behind during the 1980’s. The US-
Canada gap widened considerably during the 1990’s.
The four major European nations — the UK, France, Ger-
many, and Italy — had very similar levels of output per capita
throughout the period 1980-2001. Japan rose from last place in
1980 to fourth among the G7 in 2001, lagging considerably be-
hind the US and Canada, but only slightly behind the UK Japan
led the G7 in the growth of output per capita from 1980-1995, but
fell behind the US, Canada, the UK, France, and Italy after 1995. 
In Table 1 I present input per capita for the G7 over the period
1980-2001, taking the US as 100.0 in 2000. I express input per
capita in US dollars, using purchasing power parities constructed
for this study.
10 The US was the leader among the G7 in input per
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10 The purchasing power parities for outputs are based on OECD (2002). Pur-
chasing power parities for inputs follow the methodology described in detail by
JORGENSON D.W. - YIP E. (2001).capita throughout the period. In 2001 Canada ranked next to the
US with Japan third and the Germany fourth. France and Italy
started at the bottom of the ranking and remained there through-
out the period. 
In Table 1 I also present productivity levels for the G7 over
the period 1980-2001. Productivity is defined as the ratio of out-
put to input, including both capital and labor inputs. Canada was
the productivity leader during the period 1989-2001 with France
and Italy close behind, despite the drop in productivity in Italy!
Japan made the most substantial gains in productivity, while there
were more modest increases in the US, Canada, the UK, France,
and Germany. 
I summarize growth in output and input per capita and prod-
uctivity for the G7 nations in Table 4. I present growth rates of
output and population for the period 1980-2001 in Tables 2 and
3. Output growth slowed in the G7 after 1989, but revived for all
Information Technology and the G7 Economies D.W. JORGENSON
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TABLE 1
LEVELS OF OUTPUT AND INPUT PER CAPITA AND 
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
output per capita
1980 63.9 67.6 45.0 45.9 49.3 45.9 43.6
1989 79.7 78.8 56.5 54.1 58.6 57.3 58.4
1995 85.6 79.6 61.4 57.0 65.0 62.1 65.4
2001 100.3 91.9 71.3 64.0 69.2 68.8 70.4
input per capita
1980 70.5 64.2 50.2 46.5 61.0 43.1 61.9
1989 83.9 74.4 61.2 53.3 71.1 55.5 74.8
1995 88.8 75.2 67.0 57.0 73.7 58.8 78.8
2001 100.8 83.7 73.6 61.7 79.0 67.2 81.1
total factor productivity
1980 90.6 105.4 89.5 98.6 80.8 106.6 70.4
1989 94.9 105.9 92.3 101.5 82.4 103.2 78.0
1995 96.4 105.9 91.7 99.9 88.1 105.6 83.0
2001 99.5 109.7 96.9 103.6 87.6 102.5 86.8
Note: US = 100.0 in 2000, Canada data begins in 1981.nations except Japan and Germany after 1995. Output per capita
followed a similar pattern with Canada barely expanding during
the period 1989-1995. 
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TABLE 2
GROWTH RATE AND LEVEL OF OUTPUT
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
growth rate (percentage)
1980-1989 3.38 3.10 2.69 2.38 1.99 2.51 3.83
1989-1995 2.43 1.39 1.62 1.30 2.34 1.52 2.23
1995-2001 3.76 3.34 2.74 2.34 1.18 1.90 1.45
level (billions of 2000 US Dollars)
1980 5361.2 618.4 934.0 932.0 1421.7 955.7 1875.9
1989 7264.2 792.6 1190.3 1154.3 1700.2 1197.4 2648.7
1995 8403.3 861.4 1311.8 1247.8 1956.3 1311.5 3027.1
2001 10530.4 1052.3 1545.9 1436.0 2099.8 1470.1 3301.3
level (US = 100.0 in 2000)
1980 51.6 5.9 9.0 9.0 13.7 9.2 18.0
1989 69.9 7.6 11.4 11.1 16.3 11.5 25.5
1995 80.8 8.3 12.6 12.0 18.8 12.6 29.1
2001 101.3 10.1 14.9 13.8 20.2 14.1 31.7
Note: Canada data begins in 1981.
TABLE 3
GROWTH RATE AND LEVEL IN POPULATION
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
growth rate
1980-1989 0.92 1.18 0.16 0.54 0.05 0.05 0.59
1989-1995 1.23 1.22 0.24 0.45 0.62 0.18 0.33
1995-2001 1.12 0.95 0.24 0.41 0.14 0.18 0.22
level (millions)
1980 227.7 24.8 56.3 55.1 78.3 56.4 116.8
1989 247.4 27.3 57.1 57.9 78.7 56.7 123.1
1995 266.3 29.4 58.0 59.4 81.7 57.3 125.6
2001 284.8 31.1 58.8 60.9 82.3 57.9 127.2
level (US = 100.0 in 2000)
1980 80.7 8.8 20.0 19.5 27.8 20.0 41.4
1989 87.7 9.7 20.3 20.5 27.9 20.1 43.6
1995 94.4 10.4 20.5 21.1 28.9 20.3 44.5
2001 101.0 11.0 20.8 21.6 29.2 20.5 45.1
Note: Percentage, Canada data begins in 1981.Japan led in growth of output per capita through 1995, but
fell to the lower echelon of the G7 after 1995. Japan led in prod-
uctivity growth during 1980-1989, Germany led from 1989-1995,
and the UK led from 1995-2001. For all countries and all time
periods, except for Germany during the period 1989-1995 and
Japan after 1989, the growth of input per capita exceeded growth
of productivity by a substantial margin. Productivity growth in the
G7 slowed during the period 1989-1995, except for Germany and
Italy, where productivity slumped after 1995. 
Italy led the G7 in growth of input per capita for the periods
1980-1989 and 1995-2001, but relinquished leadership to the UK
for the period 1989-1995. Differences among input growth rates
are smaller than differences among output growth rates, but there
was a slowdown in input growth during 1989-1995 throughout the
G7. After 1995 growth of input per capita increased in every G7
nation except Japan.
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TABLE 4
GROWTH IN OUTPUT AND INPUT PER CAPITA AND 
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
output per capita
1980-1989 2.46 1.92 2.54 1.84 1.93 2.46 3.25
1989-1995 1.20 0.17 1.38 0.85 1.72 1.33 1.90
1995-2001 2.64 2.38 2.50 1.93 1.04 1.72 1.23
input per capita
1980-1989 1.94 1.86 2.20 1.52 1.71 2.82 2.10
1989-1995 0.94 0.17 1.49 1.11 0.60 0.96 0.86
1995-2001 2.10 1.80 1.59 1.33 1.14 2.21 0.48
total factor productivity
1980-1989 0.52 0.06 0.34 0.32 0.23 –0.36 1.15
1989-1995 0.26 0.00 –0.11 –0.26 1.12 0.37 1.04
1995-2001 0.54 0.58 0.91 0.60 –0.10 –0.49 0.75
Note: Percentage, Canada data begins in 1981.2.2 Comparisons of Capital and Labor Quality
A constant quality index of capital input weights capital in-
puts by property compensation per unit of capital. By contrast an
index of capital stock weights different types of capital by asset
prices. The ratio of capital input to capital stock measures the
average quality of a unit of capital. This represents the difference
between the constant quality index of capital input and the index
of capital stock employed, for example, by Kuznets (1971) and
Robert Solow (1970). 
In Table 5 I present capital input per capita for the G7 coun-
tries over the period 1980-2001 relative to the US in 2000. The US
was the leader in capital input per capita throughout the period,
while Japan was the laggard. Canada led the remaining six coun-
tries in 1980, but was overtaken by Germany and Italy in 1995.
Italy led the rest of the G7 through 2001, but lagged considerably
behind the United States.
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TABLE 5
LEVELS OF CAPITAL INPUT AND CAPITAL STOCK
PER CAPITA AND CAPITAL QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
capital input per capita
1980 57.7 56.0 25.8 36.3 44.6 35.6 32.8
1989 73.7 67.1 37.9 48.3 62.1 62.4 43.5
1995 81.6 68.3 50.0 52.7 72.3 73.1 50.7
2001 103.9 78.0 56.1 58.1 83.5 89.4 58.3
capital stock per capita
1980 76.8 40.7 24.1 36.2 60.2 36.0 93.1
1989 88.4 48.5 31.2 42.4 67.9 52.4 104.1
1995 92.2 50.8 35.9 47.0 77.0 62.3 114.8
2001 101.7 55.1 44.5 52.0 85.5 72.3 122.2
capital quality
1980 75.1 137.5 107.0 100.1 74.0 98.8 35.2
1989 83.4 138.2 121.7 114.0 91.5 119.1 41.8
1995 88.5 134.6 139.3 112.2 94.0 117.4 44.2
2001 102.2 141.5 126.1 111.9 97.7 123.6 47.7
Note: US = 100.0 in 2000, Canada data begins in 1981.The picture for capital stock per capita has some similarities
to capital input, but there are important differences. Capital stock
levels do not accurately reflect the substitutions among capital in-
puts that accompany investments in tangible assets, especially in-
vestments in IT equipment and software. Japan led the G7 in cap-
ital stock per capita throughout the period 1980-2001. The UK
lagged the remaining countries of the G7 throughout the period. 
The behavior of capital quality highlights the differences be-
tween the constant quality index of capital input and capital stock.
There are important changes in capital quality over time and per-
sistent differences among countries, so that heterogeneity in cap-
ital input must be taken into account in international compar-
isons of economic performance. Canada was the international
leader in capital quality in 1980 and 2001, relinquishing the lead
to the UK in 1995, while Japan ranked at the bottom of the G7
throughout the period.
I summarize growth in capital input and capital stock per capi-
ta, as well as capital quality for the G7 nations in Table 8. Italy
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TABLE 6
LEVELS OF IT CAPITAL INPUT AND IT CAPITAL STOCK
PER CAPITA AND IT CAPITAL QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
IT capital input per capita
1980 4.5 1.0 3.0 4.2 7.1 6.7 1.7
1989 19.3 3.9 10.9 11.9 18.7 18.8 10.3
1995 38.1 11.2 20.9 19.1 31.1 31.2 19.0
2001 115.3 45.6 53.6 38.1 59.7 60.3 46.0
IT capital stock per capita
1980 9.8 0.8 2.5 3.5 6.1 4.6 3.5
1989 27.4 3.7 9.6 9.9 15.5 13.1 12.7
1995 46.8 9.7 19.2 18.0 28.2 23.8 22.9
2001 110.7 31.8 44.9 33.4 49.7 44.1 47.8
IT capital quality
1980 46.4 118.4 118.5 117.5 117.4 146.8 47.8
1989 70.4 107.4 112.7 119.7 120.4 143.2 81.1
1995 81.3 115.0 108.9 106.2 110.1 131.0 83.0
2001 104.1 143.4 119.3 114.1 120.2 136.6 96.1
Note: US = 100.0 in 2000, Canada data begins in 1981.RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2005
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TABLE 7
LEVELS OF NON-IT CAPITAL INPUT AND CAPITAL STOCK
PER CAPITA AND NON-IT CAPITAL QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
Non-IT capital input per capita
1980 73.8 73.1 30.7 41.3 51.9 41.6 39.3
1989 87.0 83.1 43.4 53.9 70.3 71.3 47.9
1995 90.7 79.9 55.9 57.9 79.7 81.2 53.9
2001 102.2 84.0 56.4 62.6 87.3 94.7 57.1
Non-IT capital stock per capita
1980 82.5 44.1 25.7 38.0 63.4 38.2 99.1
1989 92.5 51.5 32.6 44.0 70.6 54.8 110.0
1995 94.8 53.0 36.9 48.3 79.3 64.4 120.6
2001 101.4 57.4 44.5 54.1 87.2 75.1 127.1
Non-IT capital quality
1980 89.5 165.7 119.2 108.5 81.9 109.2 39.6
1989 94.1 161.2 133.2 122.6 99.5 130.0 43.6
1995 95.6 150.7 151.5 119.9 100.5 126.0 44.7
2001 100.8 146.5 126.7 115.8 100.1 126.1 44.9
Note: US = 100.0 in 2000, Canada data begins in 1981.
TABLE 8
GROWTH IN CAPITAL INPUT AND CAPITAL STOCK
PER CAPITA AND CAPITAL QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
capital input per capita
1980-1989 2.72 2.26 4.28 3.19 3.70 6.25 3.16
1989-1995 1.70 0.31 4.61 1.46 2.53 2.63 2.55
1995-2001 4.03 2.20 1.92 1.63 2.40 3.35 2.31
capital stock per capita
1980-1989 1.56 2.19 2.85 1.74 1.34 4.18 1.25
1989-1995 0.70 1.05 2.36 1.74 2.09 2.87 1.63
1995-2001 1.63 1.36 3.57 1.67 1.75 2.49 1.04
capital quality
1980-1989 1.17 0.07 1.43 1.45 2.36 2.07 1.91
1989-1995 0.99 –0.74 2.25 –0.27 0.44 –0.24 0.92
1995-2001 2.40 0.84 –1.65 –0.04 0.65 0.86 1.26
Note: Percentage, Canada data begins in 1981.was the international leader in capital input growth from 1980-
1989, while Canada was the laggard. The UK led from 1989-1995,
while Canada lagged considerably behind the rest of the G7. The
US took the lead after 1995. There was a slowdown in capital
input growth throughout the G7 after 1989, except for the UK,
and a revival after 1995 in the US, Canada, France, and Italy. 
A constant quality index of labor input weights hours worked
for different categories by labor compensation per hour. An index
of hours worked fails to take quality differences into account. The
ratio of labor input to hours worked measures the average qual-
ity of an hour of labor, as reflected in its marginal product. This
represents the difference between the constant quality index of la-
bor input and the index of hours worked employed, for example,
by Kuznets (1971) and Solow (1970).
In Table 11 I present labor input per capita for the G7 nations
for the period 1980-2001 relative to the US in 2000. Japan was
the international leader throughout the period 1980-2001. Labor
input in Japan was nearly double that in Italy. The US led the re-
maining G7 nations. The UK ranked third among the G7 through
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TABLE 9
GROWTH IN IT CAPITAL INPUT AND CAPITAL STOCK
PER CAPITA AND IT CAPITAL QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
IT capital input per capita
1980-1989 16.09 17.66 14.43 11.66 10.71 11.44 20.19
1989-1995 11.35 17.42 10.91 7.92 8.47 8.44 10.22
1995-2001 18.47 23.42 15.69 11.55 10.87 10.98 14.71
IT capital stock per capita
1980-1989 11.47 18.88 14.98 11.46 10.43 11.72 14.32
1989-1995 8.94 16.28 11.50 9.91 9.97 9.94 9.84
1995-2001 14.34 19.73 14.16 10.35 9.40 10.28 12.25
IT capital quality
1980-1989 4.63 –1.22 –0.56 0.20 0.28 –0.27 5.88
1989-1995 2.41 1.14 –0.58 –1.99 –1.50 –1.49 0.38
1995-2001 4.12 3.69 1.53 1.20 1.47 0.70 2.46
Note: Percentage, Canada data begins in 1981.RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2005
38
TABLE 10
GROWTH IN NON-IT CAPITAL INPUT AND CAPITAL STOCK
PER CAPITA AND NON-IT CAPITAL QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
Non-IT capital input per capita
1980-1989 1.83 1.60 3.85 2.97 3.36 5.97 2.21
1989-1995 0.68 –0.66 4.22 1.20 2.09 2.17 1.95
1995-2001 2.00 0.85 0.15 1.30 1.52 2.57 0.96
Non-IT capital stock per capita
1980-1989 1.27 1.94 2.62 1.61 1.20 4.03 1.16
1989-1995 0.41 0.47 2.07 1.58 1.92 2.68 1.53
1995-2001 1.11 1.32 3.12 1.87 1.59 2.56 0.88
Non-IT capital quality
1980-1989 0.56 –0.35 1.23 1.36 2.16 1.94 1.05
1989-1995 0.27 –1.13 2.15 –0.38 0.17 –0.51 0.42
1995-2001 0.88 –0.47 –2.97 –0.57 –0.06 0.01 0.08
Note: Percentage, Canada data begins in 1981.
TABLE 11
LEVELS OF LABOR INPUT AND HOURS WORKED
PER CAPITA AND LABOR QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
labor input per capita
1980 81.1 73.0 78.9 63.0 75.4 48.8 94.8
1989 91.9 82.1 85.4 59.4 78.7 51.0 107.5
1995 94.2 82.3 82.4 61.7 75.2 50.6 105.5
2001 98.8 89.3 89.2 65.3 75.9 55.1 100.9
hours worked per capita
1980 89.7 91.4 92.0 79.3 82.3 71.4 111.9
1989 97.1 96.6 97.7 71.2 82.7 72.1 115.6
1995 95.9 90.9 89.8 67.6 76.4 68.9 109.9
2001 98.3 96.3 94.2 69.7 75.3 72.3 101.1
labor quality
1980 90.4 79.9 85.7 79.5 91.6 68.3 84.7
1989 94.7 85.0 87.4 83.5 95.2 70.7 93.0
1995 98.2 90.6 91.7 91.2 98.4 73.5 96.0
2001 100.5 92.7 94.7 93.7 100.9 76.1 99.9
Note: US = 100.0 in 2000, Canada data begins in 1981.1995, but fell slightly behind Canada in 2001. Italy and France
lagged behind the rest of the G7 for the entire period. 
The picture for hours worked per capita has some similarities
to labor input, but there are important differences. Japan was the
international leader in hours worked per capita. The US, Canada,
and the UK moved roughly in parallel. The UK ranked second in
1980 and 1989, while the US ranked second in 1995 and 2001.
France and Italy lagged the rest of the G7 from 1980-2001. 
The behavior of labor quality highlights the differences be-
tween labor input and hours worked. Germany was the leader
in labor quality throughout the period 1980-2001. The US
ranked second in labor quality, but Canada, France, the UK, and
Japan approached US levels in 2001. Labor quality levels in
these four countries moved in parallel throughout the period.
Italy was the laggard among the G7 in labor quality as well as
hours worked. 
I summarize growth in labor input and hours worked per capi-
ta, as well as labor quality for the period 1980-2001 in Table 12.
Canada and Japan led the G7 nations in labor input growth dur-
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TABLE 12
GROWTH IN LABOR INPUT AND HOURS WORKED
PER CAPITA AND LABOR QUALITY
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
labor input per capita
1980-1989 1.38 1.47 0.88 –0.65 0.48 0.49 1.40
1989-1995 0.41 0.04 –0.59 0.61 –0.78 –0.13 –0.32
1995-2001 0.79 1.35 1.32 0.95 0.17 1.40 –0.73
hours worked per capita
1980-1989 0.87 0.69 0.67 –1.20 0.06 0.10 0.36
1989-1995 –0.21 –1.02 –1.41 –0.86 –1.33 –0.75 –0.84
1995-2001 0.41 0.98 0.79 0.50 –0.25 0.81 –1.39
labor quality
1980-1989 0.51 0.78 0.21 0.55 0.42 0.39 1.04
1989-1995 0.61 1.06 0.81 1.47 0.55 0.63 0.52
1995-2001 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.45 0.41 0.60 0.66
Note: Percentage, Canada data begins in 1981.ing the 1980’s, France led from 1989-1995 but relinquished its
leadership to Italy after 1995. Labor input growth was negative
for France during the 1980’s, for the UK, Germany, Italy, and Japan
during the period 1989-1995, and for Japan after 1995. 
Hours worked per capita fell continuously through the 1989-
2001 period for Japan and declined for all the G7 nations during
the period 1989-1995. Growth in labor quality was positive for the
G7 nations in all time periods. Japan was the leader during the
1980’s, relinquishing its lead to France during the early 1990’s, but
regaining its lead in the 1995-2001 period. Growth in labor qual-
ity and hours worked are equally important as sources of growth
in labor input for the G7.
3. - Investment in Information Technology
Using data from Tables 1 and 2, I can assess the relative im-
portance of investment and productivity as sources of econom-
ic growth for the G7 nations. Investments in tangible assets and
human capital greatly predominated over productivity during the
period 1980-2001. While productivity fell in Italy during this
period, the remaining G7 countries had positive productivity
growth. 
Similarly, using data from Table 5 I can assess the relative
importance of growth in capital stock and capital quality. Capital
input growth was positive for all countries for the period 1980-
2001 and all three sub-periods. Capital quality growth was posit-
ive for the period as a whole for all G7 countries. Although cap-
ital stock predominated in capital input growth, capital quality
was also quantitatively significant, especially after 1995.
Finally, using data from Table 11 I can assess the relative im-
portance of growth in hours worked and labor quality. Hours
worked per capita declined for France, Germany, and Japan, while
labor quality rose in these nations during the period 1980-2001.
For the US, Canada, the UK, and Italy, both hours worked per
capita and labor quality rose. I conclude that labor quality growth
is essential to the analysis of growth in labor input.
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The final step in the comparison of patterns of economic
growth among the G7 nations is to analyze the impact of invest-
ment in information technology equipment and software. In Table
6 I present levels of IT capital input per capita for the G7 for the
period 1980-2001, relative to the US in 2000. The US overtook
Germany in 1989 and remained the leader through 2001. Canada
lagged behind the rest of the G7 through 1995, but France fell
into last place in 2001.
Table 6 reveals substantial differences between IT capital stock
and IT capital input. The G7 nations began with very modest
stocks of IT equipment and software per capita in 1980. These
stocks expanded rapidly during the period 1980-2001. The US led
in IT capital stock throughout the period, while Japan moved from
the fourth highest level in 1980 to the third highest in 2001. 
IT capital quality reflects differences in the composition of IT
capital input, relative to IT capital stock. A rising level of capital
quality indicates a shift toward short-lived assets, such as com-
puters and software. This shift is particularly dramatic for the US,
Canada, and Japan, while the composition of IT capital stock
changed relatively less for the UK, France, Germany, and Italy. Pat-
terns for Non-IT capital input, capital stock, and capital quality
largely reflect those for capital as a whole, presented in Table 5. 
I give growth rates for IT capital input per capita, capital stock
per capita, and capital quality in Table 9. The G7 nations have ex-
hibited double-digit growth in IT capital input per capita since
1995. Canada was the international leader during this period with
the US close behind. Japan was the leader in growth of IT capi-
tal input during the 1980’s, another period of double-digit growth
in the G7. However, Japanese IT growth slowed markedly during
1989-1995 and Canada gained the lead.
Patterns of growth for IT capital stock per capita are similar
to those for IT capital input for the four European countries.
Changes in the composition of IT capital stock per capita were im-
portant sources of growth of IT capital input per capita for the
US, Canada, and Japan. IT capital stock also followed the pattern
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lowed by a pronounced lull during the period 1989-1995. After
1995 the growth rates of IT capital stock surged in all the G7
countries, but exceeded the rates of the 1980’s only for the US and
Canada.
Finally, growth rates for IT capital quality reflect the rates at
which shorter-lived IT assets are substituted for longer-lived as-
sets. 
Japan led in the growth of capital quality during the 1980’s,
but relinquished its lead to the US in 1989. IT capital quality
growth for the US, Canada, and Japan outstripped that for the
four European countries for most of the period 1980-2001. Pat-
terns of growth in Non-IT capital input per capita, Non-IT capital
stock per capita, and Non-IT capital quality given in Table 10 large-
ly reflect those for capital as a whole presented in Table 8. 
Table 13 and Graph 1 present the contribution of capital in-
put to economic growth for the G7 nations, divided between IT
and Non-IT. The powerful surge of IT investment in the US af-
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TABLE 13
CONTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CAPITAL, IT CAPITAL AND
NON-IT CAPITAL OUTPUT GROWTH
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
total capital
1980-1989 1.53 1.71 1.80 2.12 1.44 2.55 1.49
1989-1995 1.19 0.76 1.96 1.12 1.31 1.12 1.19
1995-2001 2.10 1.67 0.94 1.15 1.11 1.47 1.01
IT capital
1980-1989 0.45 0.39 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.44
1989-1995 0.49 0.49 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.32
1995-2001 0.99 0.86 0.76 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.58
Non IT capital
1980-1989 1.08 1.32 1.56 1.94 1.25 2.31 1.05
1989-1995 0.70 0.27 1.69 0.93 1.05 0.86 0.87
1995-2001 1.11 0.81 0.18 0.73 0.65 0.98 0.43
Note: Percentage. Contribution is growth rate times value share. Canada data
begins in 1981.ter 1995 is mirrored in similar jumps in growth rates of the con-
tribution of IT capital through the G7. The contribution of IT
capital input was similar during the 1980’s and the period 1989-
1995 for all the G7 nations, despite the dip in rates of economic
growth after 1989. Japan is an exception to this general pattern
with a contribution of IT capital comparable to that of the US
during the 1980’s, followed by a decline in this contribution from
1989-1995, reflecting the sharp downturn in Japanese economic
growth.
The contribution of Non-IT capital input to economic growth
after 1995 exceeded that for IT capital input for four of the G7
nations; the exceptions were Canada, the UK, and Japan. The US
stands out in the magnitude of the contribution of capital input
after 1995. Both IT and Non-IT capital input contributed to the
US economic resurgence of the last half of the 1990’s. Despite the
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)strong performance of IT investment in Japan after 1995, the con-
tribution of capital input declined substantially; the pattern for
the UK is similar.
3.2 The Relative Importance of Investment and Productivity
Table 14 and Graph 2 present contributions to economic
growth from productivity, divided between the IT-producing and
Non-IT-producing industries. The methodology for this division
follows Triplett (1996). The contribution of IT-producing indus-
tries was positive throughout the period 1980-2001 and jumped
substantially after 1995. Since the level of productivity in Italy was
higher in 1980 than in 2001, it is not surprising that the contri-
bution of productivity growth in the Non-IT industries was nega-
tive throughout the period. Productivity in these industries de-
clined during the period 1989-1995 in Canada and Germany as
well as Italy. The decline affected Canada, the UK, France, and
Italy from 1989-1995 and became very steep in Germany and Italy
from 1995-2001.
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TABLE 14
CONTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY FROM IT CAPITAL AND
NON-IT PRODUCTION TO OUTPUT GROWTH
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
productivity
1980-1989 0.52 0.06 0.34 0.32 0.23 –0.36 1.15
1989-1995 0.26 0.00 –0.11 –0.26 1.12 0.37 1.04
1995-2001 0.54 0.58 0.91 0.60 –0.10 –0.49 0.75
productivity from IT production
1980-1989 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.15
1989-1995 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.20
1995-2001 0.48 0.17 0.82 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.46
productivity from Non-IT production
1980-1989 0.29 –0.08 0.11 0.03 –0.05 –0.68 1.00
1989-1995 0.03 –0.14 –0.43 –0.55 0.69 –0.01 0.84
1995-2001 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.04 –0.75 –1.17 0.29
Note: Percentage. Canada data begins in 1981.Table 15 and Graph 3 give a comprehensive view of the
sources of economic growth for the G7. The contribution of cap-
ital input alone exceeds that of productivity for most nations and
most time periods. The contribution of Non-IT capital input pre-
dominates over IT capital input for most countries and most time
periods with Canada in 1989-1995, and the UK and Japan after
1995 as exceptions. This can be attributed to the unusual weak-
ness in the growth of aggregate demand in these countries. The
contribution of labor input varies considerably among the G7 na-
tions with negative contributions after 1995 in Japan, during the
1980’s in France, and during the period 1989-1995 in the UK and
Germany.
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TABLE 15
SOURCES OF OUTPUT GROWTH
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
output
1980-1989 3.38 3.10 2.69 2.38 1.99 2.51 3.83
1989-1995 2.43 1.39 1.62 1.30 2.34 1.52 2.23
1995-2001 3.76 3.34 2.74 2.34 1.18 1.90 1.45
labor
1980-1989 1.33 1.33 0.56 –0.06 0.32 0.32 1.20
1989-1995 0.98 0.62 –0.24 0.44 –0.09 0.03 0.00
1995-2001 1.12 1.08 0.88 0.59 0.17 0.93 –0.31
IT capital
1980-1989 0.45 0.39 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.44
1989-1995 0.49 0.49 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.32
1995-2001 0.99 0.86 0.76 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.58
Non-IT capital
1980-1989 1.08 1.32 1.56 1.94 1.25 2.31 1.05
1989-1995 0.70 0.27 1.69 0.93 1.05 0.86 0.87
1995-2001 1.11 0.81 0.18 0.73 0.65 0.98 0.43
productivity from IT production
1980-1989 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.15
1989-1995 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.20
1995-2001 0.48 0.17 0.82 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.46
productivity from Non-IT production
1980-1989 0.29 –0.08 0.11 0.03 –0.05 –0.68 1.00
1989-1995 0.03 –0.14 –0.43 –0.55 0.69 –0.01 0.84
1995-2001 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.04 –0.75 –1.17 0.29
Note: Percentage. Contribution. Canada data begins in 1981.Finally, Table 16 and Graph 4 translate sources of growth into
sources of growth in average labor productivity (ALP). ALP, de-
fined as output per hour worked, must be carefully distinguished
from overall productivity, defined as output per unit of both cap-
ital and labor inputs. Output growth is the sum of growth in hours
worked and growth in ALP. ALP growth depends on the contri-
bution of capital deepening, the contribution of growth in labor
quality, and productivity growth. 
Capital deepening is the contribution of growth in capital in-
put per hour worked and predominates over productivity as a
source of ALP growth for the G7 nations. IT capital deepening
predominates over Non-IT capital deepening in the US through-
out the period 1980-2001 and in Canada after 1989, the UK and
France after 1995. Finally, the contribution of labor quality is pos-
itive for all the G7 nations through the period.
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TABLE 16
SOURCES OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Year US Canada UK France Germany Italy Japan
output
1980-1989 3.38 3.10 2.69 2.38 1.99 2.51 3.83
1989-1995 2.43 1.39 1.62 1.30 2.34 1.52 2.23
1995-2001 3.76 3.34 2.74 2.34 1.18 1.90 1.45
hours
1980-1989 1.79 1.87 0.82 –0.66 0.11 0.15 0.95
1989-1995 1.02 0.20 –1.17 –0.41 –0.71 –0.57 –0.51
1995-2001 1.53 1.93 1.03 0.91 –0.11 0.99 –1.14
labor productivity
1980-1989 1.58 1.23 1.87 3.04 1.88 2.36 2.89
1989-1995 1.40 1.19 2.79 1.71 3.05 2.09 2.74
1995-2001 2.23 1.41 1.71 1.43 1.29 0.92 2.59
IT capital deepening
1980-1989 0.40 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.42
1989-1995 0.44 0.48 0.29 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.33
1995-2001 0.92 0.79 0.71 0.39 0.46 0.45 0.63
Non-IT capital deepening
1980-1989 0.37 0.42 1.20 2.29 1.20 2.25 0.69
1989-1995 0.34 0.16 2.11 1.15 1.33 1.06 1.06
1995-2001 0.55 –0.14 –0.21 0.25 0.70 0.61 0.83
labor quality
1980-1989 0.30 0.40 0.12 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.63
1989-1995 0.36 0.55 0.49 0.61 0.33 0.38 0.31
1995-2001 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.23 0.35 0.38
productivity from IT production
1980-1989 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.15
1989-1995 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.29 0.43 0.38 0.20
1995-2001 0.48 0.17 0.82 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.46
productivity from Non-IT production
1980-1989 0.29 –0.08 0.11 0.03 –0.05 –0.68 1.00
1989-1995 0.03 –0.14 –0.43 –0.55 0.69 –0.01 0.84
1995-2001 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.04 –0.75 –1.17 0.29
Note: Percentage. Contribution. Canada data begins in 1981.4. - Alternative Approaches
Edward Denison’s (1967) pathbreaking volume, Why Growth
Rates Differ, compared differences in growth rates for national in-
come net of capital consumption per capita for the period 1950-62
with differences of levels in 1960 for eight European countries and
the US. The European countries were characterized by much more
rapid growth and a lower level of national income per capita. How-
ever, this association did not hold for all comparisons between the
individual countries and the US. Nonetheless, Denison concluded:
11
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11 See DENISON E.F. (1967), «The Sources of Growth and the Contrast between
Europe and the United States», Chapter 21, pp. 296-348, 1967.«Aside from short-term aberrations Europe should be able to re-
port higher growth rates, at least in national income per person
employed, for a long time. Americans should expect this and not
be disturbed by it».
Maddison (1987), (1991) constructed estimates of aggregate
output, input, and productivity growth for France, Germany,
Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for the period
1870-1987. Maddison (1995) extended estimates for the US, the
UK, and Japan backward to 1820 and forward to 1992. He de-
fined output as gross of capital consumption throughout the
period and constructed constant quality indices of labor input for
the period 1913-1984, but not for 1870-1913.
Maddison employed capital stock as a measure of the input
of capital, ignoring the changes in the composition of capital stock
that are such an important source of growth for the G7 nations.
This omission is especially critical in assessing the impact of in-
vestment in information technology. Finally, he reduced the
growth rate of the price index for investment by one percent per
year for all countries and all time periods to correct for biases
like those identified by Wyckoff (1995).
4.1 Comparisons without Growth Accounts
Kuznets (1971) provided elaborate comparisons of growth
rates for fourteen industrialized countries. Unlike Denison (1967),
he did not provide level comparisons. Maddison (1982) filled this
lacuna by comparing levels of national product for sixteen coun-
tries. These comparisons used estimates of purchasing power par-
ities by Irving Kravis, Alan Heston and Robert Summers (1978).
12
Maddison (1995) extended his long-term estimates of the
growth of national product and population to 56 countries, cover-
ing the period 1820-1992. Maddison (2001) updated these esti-
mates to 1998 in his magisterial volume, The World Economy: A
Millennial Perspective. He provided estimates for 134 countries, as
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12 For details see MADDISON A. (1982), pp. 159-68.well as seven regions of the world — Western Europe, Western
Offshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States), Eastern Europe, Former USSR, Latin America, Asia, and
Africa.
Purchasing power parities have been updated by successive
versions of the Penn World Table. A complete list of these tables
through Mark 5 is given by Summers and Heston (1991). The cur-
rent version of the Penn World Table is available on the Center
for International Comparisons website at the University of Penn-
sylvania (CICUP). This covers 168 countries for the period 1950-
2000 and represents one of the most significant achievements in
economic measurement of the postwar period.
13
4.2 Convergence
Data presented by Kuznets (1971), Maddison, and successive
versions of the Penn World Table have made it possible to recon-
sider the issue of convergence raised by Denison (1967). Moses
Abramovitz (1986) was the first to take up the challenge by ana-
lyzing convergence of output per capita among Maddison’s sixteen
countries. He found that convergence characterized the postwar
period, while there was no tendency toward convergence before
1914 and during the interwar period. Baumol (1986) formalized
these results by running a regression of growth rate of GDP per
capita over the period 1870-1979 on the 1870 level of GDP per
capita.
14
In a highly innovative paper on «Crazy Explanations for the
Productivity Slowdown» Paul Romer (1987) derived Baumol’s
«growth regression» from Solow’s (1970) growth model with a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Romer’s empirical contribu-
Information Technology and the G7 Economies D.W. JORGENSON
51
13 See HESTON A. - SUMMERS R. - ATEN B. (2002). The CICUP website is at:
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/aboutpwt.html.
14 BAUMOL W.’s  (1986) “growth regression” has spawned a vast literature, re-
cently summarized by DURLAUF S. - QUAH D. (1999); MCGRATTAN E. - SCHMITZ J.
(1999); ISLAM N. (2003). Much of this literature is based on data from successive
versions of the Penn World Table.tion was to extend the growth regressions from Maddison’s (1982)
sixteen advanced countries to the 115 countries in the Penn World
Table (Mark 3). Romer’s key finding was an estimate of the elas-
ticity of output with respect to capital close to three-quarters. The
share of capital in GNP implied by Solow’s model was less than
half as great.
Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David Weil (1992) de-
fended the traditional framework of Kuznets (1971) and Solow
(1970). The empirical part of their study is based on data for 98
countries from the Penn World Table (Mark 4). Like Paul Romer
(1987), Mankiw, David Romer and Weil derived a growth regres-
sion from the Solow’s (1970) model; however, they augmented this
by allowing for investment in human capital. 
The results of Mankiw, David Romer, and Weil (1992) pro-
vided empirical support for the augmented Solow’s model. There
was clear evidence of the convergence predicted by the model; in
addition, the estimated elasticity of output with respect to capital
was in line with the share of capital in the value of output. The
rate of convergence of output per capita was too slow to be con-
sistent with 1970 version of the Solow’s model, but supported the
augmented version.
4.3 Modeling Productivity Differences
Finally, Islam (1995) exploited an important feature of the
Penn World Table overlooked in prior studies. This panel data set
contains benchmark comparisons of levels of the national prod-
uct at five year intervals, beginning in 1960. This made it possi-
ble to test an assumption maintained in growth regressions. These
regressions had assumed identical levels of productivity for all
countries included in the Penn World Table. 
Substantial differences in levels of productivity among coun-
tries have been documented by Denison (1967), by my papers with
Christensen and Cummings (1981), Dougherty (1996), (1999), and
Yip (2000) and in Section 2 above. By introducing econometric
methods for panel data Islam (1995) was able to allow for these
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and Weil (1992) that the elasticity of output with respect to cap-
ital input coincided with the share of capital in the value of out-
put.
In addition, Islam (1995) found that the rate of convergence
of output per capita among countries in the Penn World Table sub-
stantiated the unaugmented version of the Solow’s (1970) growth
model. In short, «crazy explanations» for the productivity slow-
down, like those propounded by Paul Romer (1987), (1994), were
unnecessary. Moreover, the model did not require augmentation
by endogenous investment in human capital, as proposed by
Mankiw, David Romer and Weil (1992).
Islam concluded that differences in technology among coun-
tries must be included in econometric models of growth rates.
This requires econometric techniques for panel data, like those
originated by Gary Chamberlain (1984), rather than the regres-
sion methods of Baumol, Paul Romer and Mankiw, David Romer
and Weil. Panel data techniques have now superseded regression
methods in modeling differences in output per capita.
5. - Conclusions
I conclude that a powerful surge in investment in informa-
tion technology and equipment after 1995 characterizes all of the
G7 economies. This accounts for a large portion of the resurgence
in US economic growth, but contributes substantially to econom-
ic growth in the remaining G7 economies as well. Another sig-
nificant source of the G7 growth resurgence after 1995 is a jump
in productivity growth in IT-producing industries.
For Japan the dramatic upward leap in the impact of IT in-
vestment after 1995 was insufficient to overcome downward pres-
sures from deficient growth of aggregate demand. This manifests
itself in declining contributions of Non-IT capital and labor in-
puts. Similar downturns are visible in Non-IT capital input in
France, Germany, and especially the UK after 1995.
These findings are based on new data and new methodology
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monized prices for information technology equipment and soft-
ware are essential for capturing differences among the G7 nations.
Constant quality indices of capital and labor inputs are necessary
to incorporate the impacts of investments in information tech-
nology and human capital.
Exploiting the new data and methodology, I have been able
to show that investment in tangible assets is the most important
source of economic growth in the G7 nations. The contribution
of capital input exceeds that of productivity for all countries for
all periods. The relative importance of productivity growth is far
less than suggested by the traditional methodology of Kuznets
(1971) and Solow (1970), which is now obsolete.
The conclusion from Islam’s (1995) research is that the Solow
(1970) model is appropriate for modeling the endogenous accu-
mulation of tangible assets. It is unnecessary to endogenize human
capital accumulation as well. The transition path to balanced
growth equilibrium after a change in policies that affects invest-
ment in tangible assets requires decades, while the transition after
a change affecting investment in human capital requires as much
as a century.
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